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Observers, while stationed aboard [commercial] fishing vessels, shall
carry out such scientific, compliance monitoring, and other functions
. . . necessary or appropriate to carry out the purposes of [the Magnu-
son Act]; and shall cooperate in carrying out such other scientific
programs relating to the conservation and management of living
resources .... I
I. INTRODUCTION
The commercial fishing industry has historically been subject to
a host of conservation-based regulations.2 Enforcement of these
regulations, however, has proven problematic. Once the commercial
fishing fleet was out to sea, there was no reliable way to verify that the
regulations were followed.
As commercial fishing took an increasing toll on the marine
ecosystem, conservationists and fishermen alike began pressuring
lawmakers to provide a reliable check on the fishing industry.' In
response, Congress created a new class of maritime employee: the
observer.4 An observer aboard a commercial fishing vessel would
B.A. 1991, U.C.L.A.; J.D. 1995. Seattle University School of Law. The author wishes to
thank Charles E. Belknap for encouraging study of this topic.
1. 16 U.S.C. § 1821(i)(3) (1988). This section is part of the Magnuson Fishery Conservation
and Management "Magnuson (Act)," codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1882 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
2. Lovgren v. Byrne, 787 F.2d 857, 865 (3d Cir. 1986).
3. Karen Franklin, Alaskan Fisheries: The Battle Between Conservation and Resource
Allocation, PAC. NORTHWEST EXECUTIVE, Apr. 1990, at 3.
4. An observer is a researcher/technician aboard a commercial fishing vessel or at a shoreside
facility who collects data in accordance with one of the federally mandated observer programs.
Although observers are hired by certified contractors, observers must be certified by the National
Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS). To be certified, an observer should have a bachelor's degree
in fisheries, wildlife biology, or a related field of biology or natural resource management.
Observers must also successfully complete a three week training course conducted by NMFS.
The training includes instruction in sampling duties and methods, species identification, fishery
regulations, life at sea, and cold water safety and survival. Heather Weikart & Russell Nelson,
The Domestic Observer Program, ALASKA'S MARINE RESOURCES, Dec. 1991, at 5.
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gather scientific data, monitor the fishing catch and bycatch rate, and
ensure that the vessel complied with the conservation regulations.
However, creation of this new class of maritime employee created
a new problem. As observers were placed aboard commercial fishing
vessels, they were exposed to the same perils and hazards of the sea
which plagued traditional seamen.6  Predictably, observers were
injured and turned to the courts for a remedy. Courts, however, were
not equipped to deal with this new class of maritime employee because
Congress had not defined the observer's legal status.7 Observers did
not clearly fit into any of the existing maritime classifications,8 and
there were questions as to whether observers were entitled to the
special protections traditionally afforded to certain maritime employ-
ees.9
This Comment addresses the question of how observers should be
classified within the structures of maritime law. Part II discusses the
importance of the fisheries observer program, as well as the federal
authority that created it. Part III discusses the risks and remedies
afforded to those who work upon the high seas and presents the policy
reasons for granting observers seaman status. Part IV discusses the
judicial debate surrounding this issue and presents the legal reasons for
granting observers seaman status. Part V discusses how the reauthori-
zation of the Magnuson Act provides an opportunity to clearly define
the observer's legal status. Finally, Part VI concludes that because
observers are exposed to the same high rate of injury which plagues
traditional seamen, and because observers satisfy the Supreme Court's
test for seaman status,10 observers should be provided the full panoply
of remedies available to these traditional maritime employees.
5. Bycatch, or incidental take, is the catch of fish species, seabirds, or marine mammals other
than the intended target catch.
6. See infra notes 85-101 and accompanying text.
7. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1882, 1862(e). The Magnuson Act does not define the observer's
legal status, nor does it address or make provisions for the redress of personal injury by observers.
See infra Part II.B.2.c.
8. Traditional maritime classifications include seamen, fishermen, longshoremen, harbor
workers, and processing workers aboard processing vessels. CHARLES M. DAVIS, MARITIME
LAW DESKBOOK 97-101 (1994).
9. Arctic Alaska Fisheries Corp. v. Feldman, No. C93-42R (W.D. Wash. filed Mar. 5,
1993).
10. McDermott Int'l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337 (1991). See also infra Part IV.A.
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II. EMERGENCE OF THE FISHERIES OBSERVER PROGRAM
A. More Fish in the Sea? The Importance of the Observer's Role
This is a conservation emergency of global dimensions .... What is
happening in oceans and seas all around the world is already a full-
bloum environmental disaster, potentially one of the worst in history."
Although the fluctuation of fishstocks is not a new phenomenon,
never before have so many commonplace species been fished so
perilously close to oblivion.' 2 Since 1989, when the world's marine
fish catch peaked at eighty-six million metric tons, stocks of fish have
rapidly plummeted. 3 Four of the world's seventeen major fisheries
are commercially depleted, and nine more are in serious decline.' 4
Currently, most commercial fish species are classified as "depleted,"
"fully exploited," or "overexploited" which, according to the United
Nations, could lead to potentially "disastrous social and economic
consequences."15
Accurate estimates of the fishing mortality rate are essential to
managing populations of desirable species.'6 In the past, fishery
managers were forced to rely on vessel operators for these estimates.' 7
This data was notoriously poor.'" Because certain species of fish were
not typically harvested for consumption, they were not brought to port
to be counted.'9 Without a reliable check on the commercial fishing
industry, there was little incentive for vessel owners to accurately
monitor and report their catch rates. Consequently, large numbers of
undesirable catch were routinely dumped overboard.20 Even today,
an alarming twenty-five percent of all fish caught in the world's oceans
is wasted.2' This translates into an estimated average of twenty-seven
11. Colin Nickerson, Troubled Waters, GAZETTE (Montreal), May 21, 1994, at H12.
12. Id.
13. The Catch About Fish, ECONOMIST, Mar. 19, 1994, at 13.
14. Nickerson, supra note 11, at H12.
1S. Id.
16. Cf. Weikart & Nelson, supra note 4, at 5.
17. Interview with Janet Wall, Task Leader for the Foreign Fisheries Observer Program,
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)/National Marine Fisheries Service
(NMFS), in Seattle, Wash. (Nov. 21, 1993).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Solveig Torvik, All 17 of the World's Fisheries Are in Decline, Fish Going... Going...
Gone, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Dec. 11, 1994, at I1.
21. Id.
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million metric tons of fish thrown overboard by commercial fishermen
per year.2"
Though the problems of self-monitoring are obvious, the resulting
environmental impact is not so obvious. Because ocean fish are not
declared extinct as are other species,23 the rapid depletion of fisheries
may not be noticed until irreversible damage has occurred. This is
why the creation of the fisheries observer program was so crucial.
Observers aboard commercial fishing vessels now provide the
consistent monitoring and reliable data essential to the proper
management of fisheries resources.
The data collected by observers is used by the National Marine
Fisheries Service (NMFS) to ensure that conservation goals are being
met."' Primary uses of the data include: (1) estimating the bycatch
rates of prohibited species; (2) monitoring individual vessel perfor-
mance and compliance with bycatch rate standards; (3) assessing the
status and health of groundfish stocks; (4) investigating predator-prey
relationships; (5) determining incidental takes of marine mammals and
analyzing fishery-marine mammal interactions; (6) appraising impacts
on fisheries and stocks of proposed actions by other federal or state
agencies; and (7) assisting fishery development activities.25
Environmentalists, commercial fishermen, and regional fishery
council members agree that scientific observers are desperately needed
to monitor bycatch problems and to improve the quality of data
provided to NMFS 6 Without observers, such monitoring would not
be possible.
B. Federal Authority for the Fisheries Observer Program: The
Magnuson Act
Do not blame fishermen for overfishing. They are behaving rationally
as they have always done .... Blame instead those who have power
over the fleets, and who have taken the sea into their custody:
governments.27
22. Id. See also the correction run in the SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Dec. 19, 1994,
at I1.
23. Jon Margolis, Is This Fish Story, Like All of Them, a Bit Exaggerated?, CHI. TRIB., Jun.
27, 1994, at 13.
24. Weikart & Nelson, supra note 4, at S.
25. Id.
26. Franklin, supra note 3, at 3.
27. The Catch About Fish, supra note 13, at 13.
[Vol. 18:629
Fisheries Observers
As a consequence of increased fishing pressure and the inadequacy
of the fishery conservation schemes promulgated by Congress, certain
stocks of fish were overfished to the point where their survival was
threatened.2" In 1973, foreign fishing alone took seventy percent of
the commercial catch within domestic waters and overharvested sixteen
species. 9 To remedy this situation, Congress passed the Magnuson
Fishery Conservation and Management Act 30 (the "Magnuson Act")
to end foreign domination and energize the U.S. fishing industry.31
In enacting the legislation, Congress declared, "[a] national program for
the conservation and management of the fishery resources of the
United States is necessary to prevent overfishing, to rebuild overfished
stocks, to insure conservation, and to realize the full potential of the
Nation's fishery resources."32
A primary goal of the Magnuson Act was to immediately begin
conserving and managing the fishery resources found off the coasts of
the United States by establishing a 200 mile fishery conservation zone
(the Exclusive Economic Zone ("EEZ"))33 within which the United
States would assume exclusive fishery management authority.34 The
federal government delegated to each coastal state the right to
determine the allowable catch and exploitation of fisheries within its
EEZ and the duty to ensure proper conservation and management of
living resources.3" A general requirement, however, was that popula-
tions of harvestable fisheries be maintained and restored at levels to
produce the "maximum sustainable yield" (the level of fishing at which
the maximum tonnage of the stock can be harvested without stock
depletion).36
A concurrent goal of the Magnuson Act was to provide special
protection to particular domestic fisheries. 37  The Act established
28. 16 U.S.C. § 1801(aX2)(A) (1988 & Supp. 111990).
29. Franklin, supra note 3, at 3.
30. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1882 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
31. Franklin, supra note 3, at 3.
32. 16 U.S.C. § 1801(aX6).
33. The fishery conservation zone became known as the "Exclusive Economic Zone" (EEZ)
following a 1983 proclamation by President Ronald Reagan. Legislation to Authorize the
Appropriation of Funds for Implementation of the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management
Act: Hearings on H.R. 780 Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries Management, 103d. Cong., 1st Sess.
2 (1993) (memorandum to members of the subcommittee on Fisheries Management). The EEZ
begins at the outerlimit of the territorial sea and extends 200 miles from the baseline of the coastal
state. 19 U.S.C. § 1401() (1988).
34. 16 U.S.C. § 1801(bX1XA).
35. THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW 33 (1994).
36. Id.
37. 16 U.S.C. § 1801(bX6).
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eight Regional Fishery Management Councils ("Councils") to prepare,
monitor and revise fishery management plans to maintain the optimum
yield from each domestic fishery.3" The Councils were required to
"prepare and submit to the Secretary [of Commerce] a fishery
management plan with respect to each fishery within its geographical
area of authority that requires conservation and management."3 9
The Magnuson Act thus mandated observer monitoring in two
areas: (1) foreign fishing within the EEZ4" and (2) certain fishing
within the North Pacific Fisheries.41 The Secretary of Commerce,
acting through NMFS, implements observer coverage of foreign vessels
within the EEZ, while the North Pacific Fisheries Management
Council4 2 implements observer coverage of vessels within the North
Pacific Fisheries.
1. Foreign Fishing Within the Exclusive Economic Zone
Under the Magnuson Act, no foreign fishing vessel is permitted
within the United States' EEZ unless specifically authorized.43
Foreign fishing within the EEZ may, however, be conducted pursuant
to an international fishery agreement that meets the requirements of
Section 1821 of the Magnuson Act.44 Each agreement must include
a binding commitment on the part of the foreign nation and its fishing
vessels to comply with the various terms and conditions of the
Magnuson Act.4" One such condition provides:
The foreign nation, and the owner or operator of any fishing vessel
fishing pursuant to such agreement, will abide by the requirement
that... United States' observers.., be permitted to be stationed
38. Id. § 1801(b)(5), 18 52(a) (1988 & Supp. 111990).
39. Id. § 1852(h)(1) (1988 & Supp. 111990).
40. In addition to observer coverage on foreign vessels within the EEZ, the Magnuson Act
instructs the Secretary of Commerce to establish a program under which a United States' observer
will be stationed aboard each foreign fishing vessel while that vessel is within "the Convention
area as defined in Article I of the International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic
Tunas; and is taking or attempting to take any species of fish if such taking or attempting to take
may result in the incidental taking of billfish." 16 U.S.C. § 1827(b). The term "billfish" means
any species of marlin, spearfish, sailfish or swordfish. 16 U.S.C. § 1827(a)(2).
41. The North Pacific Fisheries are the fisheries in the Arctic Ocean, Bering Sea, and Pacific
Ocean seaward of Alaska. See 16 U.S.C. § 1852(a)(7).
42. The North Pacific Fishery Management Council consists of the States of Alaska,
Washington, and Oregon, and has authority over the fisheries in the Arctic Ocean, Bering Sea,
and Pacific Ocean seaward of Alaska. The North Pacific Council has eleven voting members,
including seven appointed by the Secretary of Commerce. Id.
43. 16 U.S.C. § 1821(a).
44. Id. § (c).
45. Id.
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aboard any such vessel and that all of the costs incurred incident to
such stationing, including the costs of data editing and entry and
observer monitoring, be paid for... by the owner or operator of the
vessel .... 46
Thus, observers must be stationed on any foreign fishing vessel
fishing within the EEZ. This requirement may be waived only if: (1)
"the time during which the [foreign] vessel engages in such fishing will
be of such short duration that the placing of a United States' observer
aboard the vessel would be impractical;"47 (2) "the facilities of the
vessel for the quartering of a United States observer, or for the carrying
out of observer functions, are so inadequate or unsafe that the health
or safety of an observer would be jeopardized;"4 or (3) "for reasons
beyond the control of the Secretary [of Commerce], an observer is not
available. "4
Observers stationed aboard the foreign vessels carry out scientific
compliance monitoring, and other functions as the Secretary of
Commerce deems necessary to carry out the purposes of the Magnuson
Act. 0  Observers also cooperate in carrying out other scientific
programs relating to the conservation and management of living
resources.51
Although fishery observer programs have existed since 1973, until
recently American observers only worked on foreign vessels within the
EEZ.12  As foreign fishing within the EEZ declined to negligible
amounts,53 the National Marine Fisheries Service turned its attention
to the domestic fishing fleet.
2. Fishing Within the North Pacific Fisheries
a. Observer Coverage
In 1990, in accordance with amendments to the Magnuson Act,
American observers began collecting data on American vessels fishing
in the North Pacific. 4  These amendments mandated observer
46. Id. § (c)(2XD).
47. Id. § (iX2)(B).
48. Id.
49. Id. § (iX2)(c).
50. Id. § (iX3).
51. Id.
52. Fisheries Observer Programs, ALASKA'S MARINE RESOURCES, Dec. 1991, at 2.
53. See infra Part II.C. and notes 72-74.
54. Fisheries Observer Programs, supra note 52, at 2.
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coverage of certain vessels fishing within the North Pacific Fisheries."5
The fisheries affected by these provisions are the groundfish fisheries
of the Bering Sea and the Gulf of Alaska.1
6
The North Pacific Fisheries Management Council (the "Council")
had the authority to prepare a "fisheries research plan" for the
regulation of these fisheries.5 7 The plan required that,
[o]bservers be stationed on fishing vessels engaged in the catching,
taking or harvesting of fish, and on United States fish processors
fishing or processing species under the jurisdiction of the Council
... for the purpose of collecting data necessary for the conservation,
management, and scientific understanding of any fisheries under the
Council's jurisdiction."
Although the design and implementation of the research plan was
largely controlled by the Council, the Magnuson Act set some basic
standards. For example, the Magnuson Act required the research plan
to be reasonably calculated to,
gather reliable data, by stationing observers on all or a statistically
reliable sample of the fishing vessels and United States fish
processors included in the plan, necessary for the conservation,
management, and scientific understanding of the fisheries covered
by the plan; [and to] take into consideration the operating require-
ments of the fisheries and the safety of observers and fishermen. 9
55. 16 U.S.C. § 1862(a). "A mothership processor vessel of any length that processes 1,000
[metric tons] or more . .. of groundfish during a calendar month is required to have a NMFS
certified observer on board the vessel each day it receives or processes groundfish during that
month." 50 C.F.R. § 672.27(c)(iii)(A); 50 C.F.R. § 675.25(c)(iii)(A). "A mothership processor
vessel of any length that processes 500 [metric tons] to 1,000 [metric tons] . . . of groundfish
during a calendar month is required to have a NMFS certified observer on board the vessel at
least thirty percent of the days it receives or processes groundfish during that month." Id.
§§ 672.27(c)(iii)(B); 675.25(c)(1)(iii)(B). Catcher/processors or catcher vessels 125 feet length
overall or longer must carry a NMFS certified observer at all times while fishing for groundfish.
Id. §§ 672.27(cXl)(ii)(C); § 675.25(c)(1)(iiiXC). Catcher/processors or catcher vessels from 60 to
125 feet length overall must carry a NMFS certified observer during thirty percent of their days
during fishing trips in each calendar quarter of the year in which they fish more than 10 days in
the groundfish fishery all times while fishing for groundfsh. Id. §§ 672.27(cXiiiXD);
675.25(c)(1)(iii)(D).
56. Fisheries Observer Programs, supra note 52, at 2.
57. 16 U.S.C. § 1862(a) (Supp. IV 1992).
58. Id. § (a)(1).




The Council also established a system of fees to pay for the costs
of observer coverage.6" Funding for the observer program is a shared
responsibility of NMFS and the commercial fishing industry. The
Magnuson Act required that all fees collected from the commercial
fishing industry "be assessed against all fishing vessels and United
States fish processors including those not required to carry an observer
under the plan, participating in fisheries under the jurisdiction of the
Council . "..."61 The fees62 collected from vessel owners are depos-
ited in the North Pacific Fishery Observer Fund.63  The fees are
based on a percentage, not to exceed two percent, of the unprocessed
ex-vessel value of fish harvested under the jurisdiction of the Coun-
cil.64  In 1991, the estimated cost of the observer program was
$87,600 paid by commercial fishermen fishing in the North Pacific,
and $12 million paid by NMFS.
61
c. Legal Remedies Available to Observers
The Magnuson Act provides little guidance in the area of legal
remedies available to observers who are injured in the course of their
employment. However, within Section 1862(e) of the Act, Congress
anticipated the possibility of observers bringing suit against vessel
owners for personal injury. Under a section entitled "Special provi-
sions regarding observers," the Magnuson Act authorizes the Secretary
of Commerce "to review the feasibility of establishing a risk sharing
pool through a reasonable fee.., to provide coverage for vessels and
owners against liability from civil suits by observers, 66 as well as to
provide for "the availability of comprehensive commercial insurance for
vessel and owner liability against civil suits by observers. '67  Thus,
60. Id. § (a)(2).
61. Id. § (b)(2)(F).
62. Id. § (b)(2).
63. Id. § (d).
64. Id. § (b)(2)(E).
65. Fisheries Observer Programs, supra note 52, at 2.
66. 16 U.S.C. § 1862(eXl)(A). Although the Secretary called hearings to review the
feasibility of establishing such a risk sharing pool, 55 Fed. Reg. 49,559-02 (1990), no decision was
ever made or published in the Code of Federal Regulations.
67. 16 U.S.C. § 1862(e)(1XB). The Insurance Technical Committee (ITC) of the North
Pacific Management Council met on November 4, 1994 at the Alaska Fisheries Science Center
(AFSG) in Seattle, Washington to address insurance issues surrounding the observer programs.
Observer contractors are currently required to procure insurance to protect their observers in the
case of on-board accidents. Because the observer's legal status has not been defined, observer
contractors are forced to carry a wide array of overlapping policies to cover any possible
1995]
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while Section 1862(e) does not specifically authorize personal injury
actions by Magnuson Act observers against vessel owners, it does
contemplate that such actions will be brought.
The importance of Section 1862(e) as a means of recovery to the
injured observer is emphasized when compared to a section within the
Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA).68 The MMPA governs
its own observer program which focuses primarily on a moratorium on
the taking of Marine Mammals.69 Within Section 1383a(e)(7) of the
MMPA, Congress declared, "[a]n observer ... may not bring an
action under any law of the United States for .. .illness, disability,
injury, or death against the vessel or vessel owner, except that a civil
action may be brought against the vessel owner for the owner's willful
misconduct .. . [or if] the observer is engaged by the owner ... to
perform any duties in service to the vessel."70
Although the Magnuson Act was enacted four years after the
MMPA, no similar provision barring suits by Magnuson Act observers
against vessel owners was included. In fact, both Acts have been
amended several times, but in none of these amendments has Congress
implemented such an exclusion of remedies to Magnuson Act
observers.71
C. Did the Magnuson Act Succeed?
As a result of the Magnuson Act, the United States' fishing
industry reclaimed the harvest from foreign domination and created a
multi-billion dollar enterprise. 72 The statistics were impressive: The
percentage of fish harvested by foreign nations declined from seventy-
classification. Thus, the coverage varies across contractors creating uncertainty and inequities for
all involved. A recent proposal from the Insurance Technical Committee (ITC) of the North
Pacific Fishery Management Council recommended that a package of coverage should be carried
by observer contractors which would cover all possible classifications and would protect the three
parties involved: observers, observer contractors and vessel owners. Such a package would
include: (1) Maritime Liability (to cover seaman's claims under the Jones Act and General
Maritime Law); (2) United States Longshoreman & Harborworkers (U.S.L. & H.); (3) State's
Worker's Compensation; (4) Contractual General Liability; and (5) Employee Related Practices.
Preferred additional coverage would include: (1) Personal property; (2) Waiver of subrogation
in favor of vessel owner, and Additional Insured status for vessel owners on liability coverage; and
(3) Hold Harmless wording in favor of vessel owner included in contractual liability coverage.
The ITC will meet again in June of 1995 to attempt to make a formal recommendation to NMFS
on this issue.
68. 16 U.S.C. § 1361 (1988).
69. Id.
70. 16 U.S.C. § 1383a(e)(7). Unlike the observer programs under the Magnuson Act, the
observer program under the MMPA is funded solely by the United States' government.
71. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1882 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
72. Franklin, supra note 3, at 3.
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one percent of the total catch in 1977 to a mere 0.2% in 1991. 73
Fifteen years after its enactment, the Magnuson Act was declared a
triumph.74
However, though the Magnuson Act had achieved the goal of re-
Americanizing domestic fisheries by eliminating foreign fishing within
the EEZ, the Act was less successful in two respects. First, once
international agreements had confined foreign fishing to waters 200
miles off the United States' coast, the federal government became more
willing to grant low interest loans to fishermen to build up the
domestic fishing fleet.73  Since 1976, the U.S. fleet has almost
doubled, leading to far worse overfishing than occurred under the
foreign fleet.76 The result of the generous government funding has
been too many vessels fishing for too few fish. In order to protect
rapidly dwindling stocks, the government drastically cut back the
number of days open for fishing." However, shorter fishing seasons
have meant forced fishing in whatever hazardous weather conditions
might exist.7' During 24-hour marathons, commercial fishermen
employ the quickest, most hazardous, and most wasteful methods of
securing their catch.79 As one commentator noted,
[S]hort seasons ... have created a circus of pounding boats and
fishing crews working [twenty-four]-hour stretches to maximize their
catch. It is hoped a short season diminishes the pressure on the
catch and limits the impact on a species. But species on the
surface-crews who are under the gun to catch within the time
limits-also become endangered by the rules.8"
73. Legislation to Authorize the Appropriation of Funds for Implementation of the Magnuson
Fishery Conservation and Management Act: Hearings on H.R. 780 Before the Subcomm. On Fisheries
Management, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1993) (memorandum to members of the Subcommittee on
Fisheries Management).
74. Franklin, supra note 3 at 3.
75. The United States' government dispersed $90 million in loan guarantees in the 1980s to
help domestic fishing companies build state of the art vessels that used hydraulic cranes to pull
in the heavy nets and could process the fish on board. Leah Harrison, Seattle's Trawler Fleet May
Be on Verge of Shakeout-Too Many Fishermen in the Sea, Not Enough Fish, SEATTLE TIMES,
Aug. 31, 1993, at D1.
76. Torvik, supra note 20, at I1.
77. Harrison, supra note 75, at D1.
78. Torvik, supra note 20, at I1.
79. Carl Safina, Where Have All the Fishes Gone? Overfishing, ISSUES ScI. & TECH., Mar.
22, 1994, at 37, 39.
80. Short Season, High Toll in Bering Fishing Derby, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 20, 1995, at B6.
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These short, frantic seasons have meant more vessels working longer
hours in worse conditions."' The results are more injuries, more
82sinkings, and more fatalities at sea.
Second, the Magnuson Act failed to afford adequate legal remedies
to the very persons entrusted with carrying out the goals of the
legislation. Although the Act contemplates the likelihood of suits by
observers against vessel owners, 3 the Act failed to legally define or
protect the observer. When an observer is injured by a defective
condition of the vessel or by the negligence of the captain or crew, the
observer is forced to present his claim to a judicial system that has
proven unwilling to provide adequate and predictable remedies.84
Thus, an unfortunate result of the Magnuson Act is that observers
are working in more dangerous conditions than ever and are not
provided adequate legal remedies to compensate for this risk.
III. ROUGH WATERS: THE RISKS AND REMEDIES TO THOSE
WHO WORK UPON THE HIGH SEAS
A. The Most Dangerous Profession
Lit's] just insane. You don't take breaks, you don't sleep ... you find
yourself falling asleep when you're still on your feet, and it's terribly
dangerous because there are a number of ways you can be injured or
killed if you're not alert."5
According to the United States Department of Labor, commercial
fishing is one of the most dangerous professions in the United
States. 6 Nearly 100 fishermen die and 250 fishing vessels are total
losses each year. 7 This death rate is seven times the national average
for all industrial groups.8 The statistics for commercial fishing in
81. Torvik, supra note 20, at I1.
82. Safina, supra note 79, at 39.
83. 16 U.S.C. § 1862(e)(1).
84. See infra Part IV.B.
85. Dick Tracy, Sea Change, SACRAMENTO BEE, Nov. 3, 1993, at SC1 (statement of
Reinette Senum, describing work on a commercial fishing vessel in Alaska during halibut season).
86. Commercial fishermen aboard documented vessels perish at extraordinarily high rates,
and are more likely to die on the job than workers in most other industries. Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Investigations and Oversight of the Public Works and Transportation Comm., U.S.
House of Representatives, 103rd Cong., 2nd Ses. 10 (1994) (testimony of Rear Admiral Arthur
E. Henn, Chief, Office of Marine Safety, Security and Environmental Protection, U.S. Coast
Guard) [hereinafter Testimony of Rear Admiral Henn].
87. Id.
88. Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, The Limits of Constituent Service: How Far Should Agencies go in
Accommodating Congressional Pleas to Aid Constituents? A High-Seas Tragedy Raises Some Tough
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Alaska are even more grim: commercial fishing in the Bering Sea is
rated thirty times more hazardous than the average job in the United
States. 9
The United States Coast Guard has historically recognized the
existence of significant safety problems within the commercial fishing
industry.90 The Coast Guard investigates 1,100 marine casualties
involving fishing vessels and responds to approximately 3,000 offshore
Search and Rescue cases involving commercial fishing vessels each
year.9 ' According to one Coast Guard Fishing Vessel Safety Coordi-
nator, "[w]e are losing 250 fishing vessels and 150 fishermen a year in
the U.S .... That's more (loss of life) than any other industry in the
United States. It's the most dangerous [profession] .. .in the U.S.,
including law enforcement and coal mining.
92
The reasons for these alarming rates of injury are not surprising.
A commercial fishing vessel is a complex industrial enterprise operating
in a hostile marine environment.93 This combination of industrial
hazards and ocean perils presents unique and unpredictable dangers to
all those on board. Obvious hazards include complex machinery and
gear, extreme weather, unpredictable tides and currents, deep waters,
relative isolation, great distances from shore, and inaccessibility of
medical facilities.94
Because of these extreme conditions, emergencies on commercial
fishing vessels develop rapidly. A vessel can go from a state of relative
calm to complete chaos in a matter of minutes. One such incident
occurred when, without any warning or indication of danger, a seventy-
foot commercial fishing vessel refused to recover from a roll, continued
to list, and started to sink. 95 In no more than seven minutes the crew
was left to fend for themselves in the forty-five degree water of the
Bering Sea.9 6 These were experienced fishermen on a routine trip in
ordinary weather.97 Another tragedy occurred as a crew was bringing
Questions for the Coast Guard, GOV'T EXECUTIVE, Jun. 1991, at 29.
89. Alaska Fishing Vessels Hazardous According to NIOSH Warning, OCCUPATIONAL &
HEALTH DAILY (BNA), Jun. 23, 1993.
90. Testimony of Rear Admiral Henn, supra note 86.
91. Commercial Fishing Industry Vessel Regulations, 53 Fed. Reg. 52,735 (1988) (codified
at 46 C.F.R. Ch. I).
92. Matthew Mosk, New Coast Guard Rules, Boardings Anger Fishermen, L.A. TIMES, June
18, 1993, at B1.
93. David W. Robertson, A New Approach to Determining Seaman Status, 64 TEX. L. REV.
79, 80 (1985).
94. Id.
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a haul of fish aboard a 162-foot vessel. 9 Suddenly, the net broke
spewing tons of fish onto the deck and causing the vessel to list.99
Water burst through several uncovered openings in the hull and in
minutes the ship capsized and sank.' °° Nine crew members died in
the frigid waters of the Bering Sea. 101 Fishing lore is replete with
similar tragedies-tragedies which are unique to those who work upon
the high seas.
In recognition of the seaman's exposure to the hazards of their
high risk environment, Congress and the Courts have afforded special
protections to seamen under United States maritime law.
102
B. Remedies Afforded to Traditional Seamen
[S]eamen are wards of the courts. The sailor's life is usually neither
exhilarating nor salutary; frequently it is grim and dangerous.103
Because of the dangers that the marine environment poses, seamen
have been the beneficiaries of extraordinary legislation."°  The
statutes of the United States have historically contained elaborate
requirements with respect to such matters as the seaman's wages,
hours, medicines, clothing, heat, watches and return transportation to
this country if destitute abroad.'0° Although current law is less
formal and paternalistic, there is still judicial and Congressional
recognition of the hazards within the commercial fishing industry.
This recognition translates into extensive regulation of the seaman's
working conditions and general welfare.
Though Congress has not adopted a worker's compensation
statute applicable to seamen, the courts and Congress have developed
three remedies available to seamen for maritime personal injuries. 106
These are (1) the doctrine of maintenance and cure in the event of
disability in service of the vessel, (2) the doctrine of seaworthiness of
the vessel on which the seaman is engaged, and (3) the Jones Act,
10 7




102. Robertson, supra note 93, at 81.
103. Litherland v. Petrolane Offshore Constr. Servs., Inc., 546 F.2d 129, 130 (5th Cir.
1977).
104. Robertson, supra note 93, at 81.
105. Southern Steamship v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31, 39 (1942).
106. This Comment does not discuss the rights and remedies available for maritime deaths.
For a thorough discussion of maritime death actions, see SCHOENBAUM, supa note 35, at 465-80.
107. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1988).
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with the right to claim damages for injury or death resulting from the
negligence of the seaman's employer.0 8
These three remedies are unique to the seaman and have proven
to be an extremely effective means of recovery for work-related
injuries. A brief description of each of the remedies demonstrates, as
one commentator noted, "no other worker in our society can invoke
such powerful relief in the event of an industrial accident."'"
1. Maintenance and Cure
The first claim that an injured seaman may bring is a claim for
maintenance and cure."' Every seaman who becomes sick or injured
during his employment is entitled to maintenance, cure, and unearned
wages"1 as a matter of right, regardless of any fault of the owner or
operator of the vessel. A claim for maintenance and cure is indepen-
dent of the claims based upon the unseaworthiness of the vessel or
Jones Act negligence, although nearly all of the benefits payable under
maintenance and cure may be recovered under those claims. Thus, a
major role of maintenance and cure today is to provide a seaman with
medical treatment from his employer or the vessel on which he is a
seaman when his illness or injury was not caused by the vessel's
unseaworthiness or the negligence of the shipowner." 2
2. The Doctrine of Seaworthiness
The second claim that an injured seaman may bring is a claim for
unseaworthiness." 3  "Seaworthiness," in the context of a seaman's
claim, means that the vessel must be a reasonably fit place to live and
work." '4 A vessel owner and its operator owe a seaman the duty to
furnish a seaworthy vessel, and are liable for an injury to a seaman
resulting from a breach of that duty."'
108. DAVIS, supra note 8, at 97.
109. SCHOENBAUM, supra note 35, at 254.
110. For a thorough discussion of the maintenance and cure remedy, see SCHOENBAUM,
supra note 35, at 348-70.
111. "Maintenance" is the seaman's reasonable expenses of room and board while ashore,
until the seaman is fit for duty or until maximum benefit of treatment is reached. "Cure" is the
reasonable medical expenses incurred by the seaman for curative treatment. "Unearned wages"
are wages that the seaman would have received had he not become sick or injured, to the end of
the voyage. DAVIS, supra note 8, at 85.
112. SCHOENBAUM, supra note 35, at 348-53.
113. For a thorough discussion of the unseaworthiness remedy, see SCHOENBAUM, supra note
35, at 333-47.
114. The seaworthiness duty applies to all parts of the vessel, including its appurtenances,
gear, equipment, and personnel. Id. at 130.
115. DAVIS, supra note 8, at 85.
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The duty of seaworthiness is imposed by maritime law as an
incident to the relationship of the seaman to the vessel. Unlike
maintenance and cure and Jones Act remedies, the vessel owner's duty
to provide a seaworthy vessel applies to all seamen aboard the vessel,
regardless of whether the vessel owner is the seaman's employer.' 6
Thus, the duty owed to a seaman is greater than the seaworthiness
duty owed to others. To the seaman, the shipowner's duty is absolute;
it does not require shipowner fault and it extends to conditions created
by the acts of third persons without any negligence or knowledge on
the part of the shipowner or his employees." 7 The unseaworthiness
cause of action can relate to any defective condition of the vessel, even
one that is temporary or arises after the ship commences its voy-
age." 8
If a court finds that a seaman's injury was caused by the
unseaworthiness of the vessel, the seaman can recover loss of income,
medical expenses, pain and suffering, and compensation for disabili-
ty."9 Because many injuries that a seaman will suffer are caused by
the condition of the vessel, as opposed to the negligence of an
individual, the remedy of unseaworthiness is an indispensable means
of recovery to the injured seaman.
3. The Jones Act
The third and final remedy available to an injured seaman is a
claim for negligence under the Jones Act. 20 Maritime common law
did not provide a seaman with a cause of action against his employer
for damages caused by the negligence of co-employees.' To
mitigate the harsh results of the traditional rule, Congress enacted the
Jones Act in 1920.12 The Jones Act grants seamen who are injured
116. Pope v. Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 412-13 (1953); Seas Shipping Co. v.
Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 99-100 (1946); Baker v. Raymond Intern., Inc., 656 F.2d 173 (5th Cir.
1981) (reiterating that the owner's obligation to provide a seaworthy vessel does not depend upon
the master/servant relationship), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 983 (1982).
117. DAVIS, supra note 8, at 85.
118. Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539 (1960). Unseaworthy conditions include,
but are not limited to, a defective hull, equipment or appliances, slippery decks, an insufficient
or incompetent crew, inadequate supplies or provisions, an improper or dangerous method of work
or operation, defective tools, failure to provide adequate safety equipment, failure to provide a safe
means of boarding and leaving the vessel, and assaults by fellow crew members. SCHOENBAUM,
supra note 35, at 344.
119. DAVIS, supra note 8, at 85-86.
120. 46 U.S.C. app. § 688. For a thorough discussion of the Jones Act, see SCHOENBAUM,
supra note 35, at 307-33.
121. The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903).
122. DAVIS, supra note 8, at 117-18.
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in the course of their employment the right to seek damages against
their employer in the same manner as the Federal Employers' Liability
Act (FELA)2 3 allows claims by railroad employees. The Jones Act
provides in pertinent part:
Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his
employment may ... maintain an action for damages at law, with
the right of trial by jury, and in such actions all statutes of the
United States modifying or extending the common-law right or
remedy in cases of personal injury to railway employees shall apply
124
Because the Jones Act is remedial legislation, it has been liberally
construed to accomplish its beneficent purposes. 121 Jones Act
precedents relax the general maritime law standards of proximate cause
between the wrongful act and the injury.126  As the Supreme Court
has emphasized, the relaxed standard of proximate cause is a special
feature of this statutory negligence action that makes it significantly
different from an ordinary common-law negligence action.2 7
The burden of proving causation under the Jones Act has been
described as "very light" or "featherweight.' 12' This "slight negli-
gence"'129 standard allows a seaman to recover if the negligence of the
vessel owner or crew played any part, even the slightest, in producing
the injury or death for which damages are sought. 30 In practice, this
means that a "jury is entitled to make permissible inferences from
unexplained events.' 131
The most common Jones Act claim is one in which the employer
is charged with the negligence of an employee that causes injury to
another employee. The Jones Act makes the employer liable for the
negligence of any of its officers, agents or employees, but the negli-
gence must be within the course and scope of the offending employee's
123. 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1988).
124. 46 U.S.C. app. § 688(a).
125. Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Line, Inc., 287 U.S. 367 (1932).
126. DAVIS, supra note 8, at 119.
127. Rogers v. Missouri Pacific Railroad, 352 U.S. 500, 509 (1957); see also Lies v. Farrell
Lines, Inc., 641 F.2d 765, 771 (9th Cir. 1981).
128. Cella v. United States, 998 F.2d 418, 427 (7th Cir. 1993) (quoting Zapata Haynie Corp.
v. Arthur, 980 F.2d 287, 289 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2999 (1993)).
129. SCHOENBAUM, supra note 35, at 319; see also Havens v. F/T Polar Mist, 996 F.2d 215,
218 (9th Cir. 1993).
130. Proof of proximate causation in the traditional sense is not required under the Jones
Act. See Sentilles v. Inter-Caribbean Shipping Corp., 361 U.S. 107 (1959).
131. Martin v. John W. Stone Oil Distrib., Inc., 819 F.2d 547, 549 (5th Cir. 1987).
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employment. 32 If a seaman's injury was caused by either the
negligence of the seaman's employer or by a fellow employee, then
under the Jones Act, a seaman can recover damages including
compensation for all past and future loss of income, expenses of
medical care (exceeding cure paid by the employer), pain and suffering,
and disability.133
An important aspect of the Jones Act is the availability of a trial
by jury. Under general maritime law, a seaman has no right to a jury
trial on his claims for maintenance and cure or unseaworthiness, unless
the claims are brought in state court or in federal court at law in
diversity cases.1  However, a seaman is entitled to a jury trial on his
Jones Act claims if he elects to bring them in federal court at law.'
When a Jones Act cause of action is joined with causes of action for
unseaworthiness and maintenance and cure, all three causes of action
may be tried to a jury."'
Thus, the relaxed standard of causation, the right to maintenance
and cure, unearned wages, and the right to jury trial, have made the
Jones Act an extremely effective means to compensate the seamen for
the negligent acts of the vessel owner and crew.
C. Remedies Afforded to Observers
Unlike commercial fishermen, injured observers will not be
afforded the general maritime law remedies of maintenance and cure,
the doctrine of seaworthiness, or the Jones Act if they are not granted
seaman status. The status of the observer would be that of a mere
visitor. In the maritime context, a "visitor" is a person other than a
passenger'37 or a seaman who is on board with the express or implied
consent of the vessel owner or operator.3 '
Visitors who are injured on board a vessel by the negligence of the
vessel operator or crew have a cause of action in admiralty.3 9 As
between the vessel owner and the visitor, however, there is no insurer
relationship and no warranty of seaworthiness. 4 A shipowner owes
132. DAVIS, supra note 8, at 119.
133. Id. at 85.
134. Id. at 126.
135. Fitzgerald v. United States Lines Co., 374 U.S. 16 (1963).
136. DAVIS, supra note 8, at 127.
137. A "passenger" is a person who travels in a public conveyance by virtue of a contract,
express or implied, which involves paying a fare or some other consideration to the carrier.
SCHOENBAUM, supra note 35, at 169.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. DAVIS, supra note 8, at 92-93.
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only the limited duty of exercising "reasonable care under the
circumstances" toward visitors aboard the vessel."' "Reasonable
care" is the duty (1) to warn visitors of any dangers which the vessel
operator knows or should know, as well as the duty (2) not to
negligently injure them.' This lower standard of care would leave
the observer uncompensated in at least two situations.
First, if the observer is injured by a defective condition of the
vessel, but is unable to prove that the vessel owner or operator knew
or should have known of the defective condition, the observer will not
recover. This may be the result in many cases. A vessel is a complex
industrial workplace that contains a myriad of concealed hazards, from
dangerous equipment to defective safety devices. Precisely because
these dangers are concealed, an injured observer will often be unable
to prove that the vessel owner actually knew or should have known of
the hazardous condition. The availability of the doctrine of seaworthi-
ness, which does not require the vessel owner's awareness of the risk-
creating condition, would ensure that observers would be adequately
compensated in these situations.
Second, if the observer is injured by the negligence of the vessel
operator or crew, but is unable to prove that the vessel owner or
operator proximately caused that injury, the observer will again be
unable to recover. This too may be the likely result in many cases.
Consider a situation where an observer is injured by the negligence of
a crew member. If the observer is not afforded Jones Act seaman
status, he may not be able to bring an action against the vessel owner
for that negligence. The observer would only be able to bring the suit
against the offending crew member, who will often times be impecu-
nious. Even if an action is brought against the vessel owner or crew
member, because of the observer's "outsider" status, there may not be
anyone aboard the vessel who would be willing to testify on the
observer's behalf. Without corroborating witnesses, the observer may
be unable to prove strict proximate cause. The availability of the Jones
Act, with its "slight negligence" standard, would ensure that observers
would be adequately compensated in such situations.
Thus, if observers are not granted seaman status, vessel owners
will owe them a lower standard of care even though observers perform
duties in service to the vessel which are as important as those of the
commercial fishermen, and even though many of the risks observers
confront are as dangerous as those of the commercial fishermen.
141. Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625 (1959).
142. Id.
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D. Sound Policy: Observers and Traditional Seamen Confront the
Same Perils of the Commercial Fishing Industry
[An observer's] work is conducted aboard commercial fishing vessels at
sea and is, therefore, conducted in a difficult and hazardous environ-
ment. Commercial fishing has been rated as one of the most hazardous
occupations in the United States. The work requires strenuous physical
activity which includes lifting heavy baskets of fish ... and long
working hours. The nature of the job is also mentally stressful due to
the confined living and working space and the differing objectives of the
observer and crew aboard the vessel.
143
Although the job title of "observer" sounds passive, the majority
of an observer's work day involves actively collecting data alongside the
commercial fishermen.114  A typical observer spends eight to twelve
hours a day on deck gathering and recording scientific information. 4'
An observer also works on all parts of the vessel including the vessel's
bridge, trawl or working deck, holding bins, processing areas, cargo
holds and any other area that is used to catch, hold or process fish.
An observer likewise uses the vessel's navigation and communication
equipment, uses pilot ladders to board vessels, and transfers among
vessels at sea in small boats or rafts.
An observer spends up to four months at a time living and
working aboard a commercial fishing vessel. An observer eats, sleeps,
and works alongside the crew of the vessel. 146 During that time, an
observer confronts treacherous weather, slippery decks, defective
equipment and appliances, inadequate safety equipment and supplies,
and dangerous methods of work. And if the vessel sinks, is set afire,
or comes into a collision, an observer has the same chance of going
down with the ship as do all others aboard. Observer injuries, which
have included hooks in the face, broken sacrums, torn ligaments,
fractured ribs, and even ameobic infections,'47 confirm that the risks
143. National Marine Fisheries Service, Observer Plan, Jul. 2, 1991 at 16-17 (on file with the
Seattle University Law Review).
144. Tyson Vogeler, The Shellfish Observer Program, ALASKA'S MARINE RESOURCES, Dec.
1991, at 7.
145. Id.
146. The Code of Federal Regulations requires that an operator of a vessel must "[p]rovide,
at no cost to the observer of the United States, accommodations on a participating vessel for the
observer which are equivalent to those provided for crew members of the participating vessel." 50
C.F.R. § 672.27(d)(lXi); 50 C.F.R. § 675.25(d)(lXi) (emphasis added).
147. Interview with Michael Lake, President, Alaskan Observers, Inc., in Seattle, Wash.
(Mar. 9, 1995) (interview notes on file with the Seattle University Law Review).
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aboard a commercial fishing vessel are as threatening to the observer
sampling the catch as they are to the fishermen making the catch.
Like a traditional seaman, an observer suffers the rigors and risks
of working in a commercial fishing environment, the psychological
stress of confined living and working space, and a strenuous workload.
Unlike a traditional seaman, however, the observer will not be
adequately compensated in the event of injury or death if he is not
granted seaman status.
The reason observers are not currently granted traditional
seaman's remedies is that Congress neglected to clarify the observer's
legal status within the Magnuson Act. In light of the paucity of
legislative authority, determination of the observer's legal status was
left adrift in a sea of conflicting judicial standards.
IV. THE JUDICIAL QUANDARY AND THE LEGAL DEBATE
A. Who is a Seaman?
Diderot may very well have had the previous Supreme Court cases
[which discuss the elements of seaman status] in mind when he wrote,
"We have made a labyrinth and got lost in it. We must find our way
out. ")148
Under maritime law, individuals who satisfy the test for seaman
status have access to special rights and remedies not afforded to other
workers.149 In order to receive the benefits of maintenance and cure,
the doctrine of seaworthiness, and the Jones Act, however, the
individual must meet the definition of a seaman. Given that the Jones
Act does not define "seaman," Congress has charged federal courts
with the duty of ascertaining who is eligible for seaman's remedies."
Courts have therefore endured an ongoing struggle to determine just
who is entitled to recover as a seaman.5
Over time, a three-prong test for determining seaman status
emerged." 2 In order for a claimant to be a seaman, (1) the vessel
must be in navigation; (2) the claimant must have a more or less
permanent connection with the vessel; and (3) the claimant must be
148. McDermott Intern., Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 353 (1991).
149. SCHOENBAUM, supra note 35, at 254.
150. J.P. Kavanagh, Jr. & D.T. Plunkett, McDermott International, Inc. v. Wilander:
Robison Revisited-The 'Aid in Navigation' Test Walks the Plank, 65 TUL. L. REV. 1747, 1748-49
(1991).
151. Id. at 1748.
152. DAVIS, supra note 8, at 97.
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aboard primarily to aid in navigation, or to contribute to the accom-
plishment of the mission of the vessel."5 3
Although the federal courts were in agreement on the meaning of
the first two prongs, the third and pivotal prong, "aid in navigation",
caused much confusion. The Supreme Court itself acknowledged that
"[o]ur wayward case law has led the lower courts to a myriad of
standards and lack of uniformity in administering the elements of
seaman status."
' 5 4
Early cases required that an individual directly contribute to the
vessel's navigation in order to meet the "aid in navigation" require-
ment: "The word 'seaman' undoubtedly once meant a person who
could 'hand, reef, and steer,' a mariner in the true sense of the word.
But as the necessities of ships increased, so the word 'seaman' enlarged
its meaning." '' Modem cases broadened the definition to include
individuals assigned to the vessel whose employment contributed to the
function of the vessel.1 16 Maritime cases are replete with examples
of unusual occupations, which, when performed at sea, constitute the
work of a seaman.5 7 These cases resulted in miscellaneous workers
being considered seamen, including engineers, firemen, barbers, cooks,
bartenders, coal passers, dipper tenders, pilots, divers, horsemen,
sealers, stewards, pursers, watchmen, porters, wreckers, laundry
workers, musicians, and telephone operators.5 ' And, according to
the Ninth Circuit, "[ilt is not inconceivable that an actor, under certain
circumstances, might be a seaman in the same manner as a musician
or a bartender might qualify." '159
Although courts began to recognize new classes of employees as
seamen, there was still much confusion as to what the "aid in
navigation" requirement really meant. In the pivotal case of McDer-
mott International, Inc. v. Wilander, 6 the Supreme Court attempted
to settle the issue when it "jettisoned" the highly restrictive "aid in
navigation" requirement and held that an individual will satisfy the
third prong for seaman status if the individual contributes to the
153. Id.; see also Desper v. Starved Rock Ferry Co., 342 U.S. 187 (1952); Barrett v. Chevron,
U.S.A., Inc., 781 F.2d 1067 (5th Cir. 1986); Estate of Wenzel v. Seaward Marine Serv., Inc., 709
F.2d 1326 (9th Cir. 1983).
154. Wilander, 498 U.S. at 353.
155. Id. at 349.
156. DAVIS, supra note 8, at 98.
157. 1 MARTIN J. NORRIS, THE LAW OF SEAMEN § 2.3, at 38-46 (4th ed. 1985).
158. Id.
159. Bullis v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 474 F.2d 392, 394 (9th Cir. 1973).
160. 498 U.S. 337 (1991).
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"function of the vessel in navigation." '161 The Court rejected the
argument that the underlying policy basis for granting special remedies
was because the individual "aids in navigation."' 62 Rather, the Court
emphasized that
[t]raditional seaman's remedies . . . have been "universally recog-
nized as ... growing out of the status of the seaman and his
peculiar relationship to the vessel, and as a feature of the maritime
law compensating or offsetting the special hazards and disadvantages
to which they who go down to sea in ships are subjected. 
''63
The Court concluded that all who work at sea in the service of a ship
face those perils to which the protection of maritime law, statutory as
well as decisional, is directed.' 64 Thus, the key to seaman status is
"employment-related connection to a vessel in navigation. "165
However, the question of whether Magnuson Act fisheries
observers have the requisite employment-related connection to a vessel
in navigation to qualify as seamen has yet to be resolved. Although no
Circuit Court has reached a definitive conclusion, 166 District Courts
within the Ninth Circuit have addressed the issue.
161. Id. at 353.
162. Id. at 353-54.
163. Id. at 354 (quoting Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 104 (1946)) (emphasis
added).
164. In reciting the history of the Jones Act, the Court highlighted an expanded definition
of seaman. The Court noted that, "federal courts throughout the last century have consistently
awarded seaman's benefits to those whose work on board ship did not direct the vessel." Id. at
343. Thus, it was not the employee's job that the Court found determinative, but the employee's
relationship with the vessel. A seaman was not required to "aid in navigation" or contribute to the
transportation of the vessel, but a seaman must "be doing the ship's work" in order to recover.
Id. at 355.
165. Id.
166. In 1993, the Eleventh Circuit held that an observer on a Japanese driftnet vessel plying
international waters was not a seaman. O'Boyle v. United States, 993 F.2d 211 (11th Cir. 1993).
The observer's duties were governed by the Driftnet Impact, Monitoring, Assessment and Control
Act of 1987 and the Shima-Asselin Treaty, which provide for the placement of American
observers on Japanese driftnet vessels fishing international waters. The O'Boyle court held that
the observer did not meet the third requirement for seaman status, because he was not
"performing the ship's work." Id. at 213. In a concurring opinion, one judge found "some
merit" in O'Boyle's argument that the vessel could not legally perform its function without
carrying him aboard and conceded that, "it cannot be said the O'Boyle's position is incorrect in
light of the paucity of relevant authority." Id. at 214 (Anderson, J., concurring).
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B. District Courts Chart a Rocky Course
The Ninth Circuit has mirrored the Supreme Court's three-prong
test for determining seaman status.167  The Circuit has also adopted
a broad interpretation of the phrase "aid in navigation" to include tasks
which contribute to the function of the vessel, or to the accomplish-
ment of its mission.1 6' However, District Courts within the Ninth
Circuit have reached different results in applying the third prong to
observers.
In January of 1992, in Key Bank of Puget Sound v. F/V Aleutian
Mist,'69 Judge Thomas Zilly considered whether an observer was a
seaman for purposes of asserting a maritime lien 7° for crew wages.
There, Key Bank brought an in rem proceeding against the F/V
Aleutian Mist to establish its priority lien status. 7' The observer
contractor whose observers had been employed on the vessel intervened
to establish its lien priority, claiming that the observers were seamen.
Because wages due a seaman are entitled to a preferred maritime lien
of the highest order, 72 if the observers were considered seamen, their
liens would have taken priority over Key Bank's lien for the preferred
ship mortgage. 7'
The test for determining whether an individual is a seaman is the
same regardless if the individual's claim arises in the maritime lien or
personal injury context.174 In applying that test, Judge Zilly held:
The fisheries observers employed by Data Contractors, Inc. do not
meet the test for "seamen" status, as applied by the Ninth Circuit
167. Wells v. Arctic Alaska Fisheries Corp., 1991 A.M.C. 448 (W.D. Wash. 1990) (quoting
Estate of Wenzel v. Seaward Marine Services, Inc., 709 F.2d 1326, 1327 (9th Cir. 1983)).
168. The Ninth Circuit has adopted the test promulgated by the Fifth Circuit in Offshore
Company v. Robison, 266 F.2d 769, 779 (5th Cir. 1959), to determine whether a claimant was
aboard to aid in navigation. Under this test, the third prong is satisfied if the capacity in which
the claimant was employed or the duties which he performed contributed to the function of the
vessel or to the accomplishment of its mission.
169. No. C91-107z (W.D. Wash. Jan. 10, 1992) (order).
170. A "maritime lien" is a non-possessory property right of a non-owner in a vessel, its
earned freight, cargo or other maritime property giving the lienholder the right in admiralty courts
to have the property sold and the proceeds distributed to the lienholder to satisfy an in rem debt
of the property. DAVIS, supra note 8 at 303; Pierside Terminal Operators, Inc. v. M/V Floridian,
389 F. Supp. 25 (E.D. Va. 1974).
171. F/V Aleutian Mist, No. C91-107z at 2.
172. DAVIS, supra note 8, at 308.
173. Under 46 U.S.C. § 31301 (1988), a preferred maritime lien includes a lien, "for wages
for the crew of the vessel." A preferred maritime lien has priority over a preferred ship mortgage.
46 U.S.C. § 31326 (1988).
174. Seattle Trust & Say. Bank v. M/V Yukon, 1987 A.M.C. 1751, 1752 (W.D. Wash.
1986); see also White v. Valley Line Co., 1985 A.M.C. 1172, 1174 (5th Cir. 1984).
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* . .and as modified by McDermott International, Inc. v. Wilander
.... The observers were independent scientific personnel who did
not perform crew functions . . . . [Tihe observers hired by Data
Contractors were not employed to perform the duties of the
crew. 
175
However, less than a year later, in Key Bank of Washington v.
Dona Karen Marie,76 then Chief Judge Barbara Rothstein found that
an observer was a seaman for purposes of asserting a preferred
maritime lien for crew wages. In recognizing the lack of authority on
the issue, Judge Rothstein began by stating, "[t]his is apparently a
matter of first impression. The parties have provided neither case law
nor statutory authority which directly addresses the question of
whether an observer is a crew member, or whether a contracting agent
may assert an observer's lien for crew wages."' 77
Judge Rothstein therefore applied the three-prong test to
determine whether the observers were seamen. 7 In analyzing the
requirements for satisfying the third prong, Judge Rothstein reasoned,
[T]he third requirement is broadly construed in the Ninth Circuit:
to aid in navigation means simply to perform duties which contrib-
ute to the function of a vessel or to the accomplishment of its
mission .... Clearly, observers also qualify under this test: [S]ince
vessels are required by law to have observers on board, a fishing
venture, at least legally speaking, would be impossible without
them.179
Because the vessel on which the observers were employed was engaged
in navigation, the observers had a more or less permanent connection
with the vessel, and the observers performed duties which contributed
to the function of the vessel or to the accomplishment of its mission,
Judge Rothstein found that the observers were seamen. 8 °
In a subsequent ruling, however, Judge Rothstein seemed to
reverse her previous course. Five months later, in Arctic Alaska
Fisheries Corp. v. Feldman,'8' Judge Rothstein applied the three-
prong test for seaman status in the context of an observer's action for
175. F/V Aleutian Mist, No. C91-1077z, at 4.
176. No. C92-I137R (W.D. Wash. Oct. 26, 1992) (order granting in part and denying in
part plaintiffs motion for summary judgment with respect to intervenors).
177. Id. at 5.
178. Id. at 8.
179. Id. at 9.
180. Id.
181. No. C93-42R (W.D. Wash. Mar. 5, 1993) (order denying defendant's motion for
summary judgment).
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personal injuries, but this time found that the observer did not satisfy
the third prong.
Judge Rothstein began by acknowledging the difficulty in
assessing the observer's legal status:
The question of how observers fit into existing structures of
maritime law can be a difficult one, and the question of whether
they are entitled to the special protections traditionally afforded to
certain maritime employees is particularly troublesome. Congress
has provided only partial guidance in this area, and no Circuit Court
has yet addressed the matter. ... [E]ven courts with this district
have not always reached consistent results when the question of an
observer's status has arisen in the context of the observer's right to
assert a maritime lien for crew wages."8 2
"Fortunately," according to Judge Rothstein, "Congress has spoken
more clearly in the context presently before the court: the context of
an observer's right to traditional seaman's remedies for personal
injuries." ' Therefore, her prior ruling that an observer was a
seaman in the context of a preferred maritime lien for crew wages, 1 4
did not control the issue of whether an observer was a seaman in the
context of a claim for personal injuries.
The "partial guidance" provided by Congress to which Judge
Rothstein referred is found within the Marine Mammal Protection Act
(MMPA)"'8  which governs its own observer program. Within
Section 1383a(e)(7) of the MMPA Congress declared that, "[a]n
observer... may not bring a civil action under any law of the United
States for .. .illness, disability, injury, or death against the vessel or
vessel owner, except that a civil action may be brought against the
vessel owner for the owner's willful misconduct ... [or if] the observer
is engaged by the owner . . .to perform any duties in service to the
vessel." '186 Relying on this authority, Judge Rothstein reasoned that,
... it is clear that an observer is not entitled to bring suit under the
Jones Act, or for unseaworthiness, or maintenance and cure, simply
because she is an observer. She must go further and show that she
belongs to that special sub-category of observers who have been
"engaged to perform duties in service to the vessel."'8 7
182. Id. at 3.
183. Id.
184. Dona Karen Marie, No. C92-1137R.
185. 16 U.S.C. § 1361 (1988).
186. Id. § 1383a(e)(7) (1988).
187. Feldman, No. C93-42R, at 4.
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Because Judge Rothstein found that this particular observer was not
"engaged to perform duties in service to the vessel," the observer did
not satisfy the third prong for seaman status.
However, although Section 1383a(e)(7) of the MMPA bars certain
civil suits by marine mammal observers, the observer before Judge
Rothstein was a fisheries observer. Accordingly, the observer's
employment was governed by the Magnuson Act, and any provision
of the MMPA would therefore be inapplicable to her. In acknowledg-
ing this dilemma, Judge Rothstein stated:
Section 1383a(e)(7) pertains by its own terms only to observers
under the Marine Mammal Protection Act; Ms. Feldman, by
contrast, was an observer in the National Marine Fisheries Service,
which was established under the Magnuson Act .... The court is
not aware of any reason, however, that observers under the two
statutes should be treated differently.'
One reason worthy of consideration is that while Section
1383a(e)(7) of the MMPA bars certain suits by observers against vessel
owners, Section 1862(e)(1) of the Magnuson Act contemplates suits by
observers against vessel owners. Section 1862(e)(1) of the Magnuson
Act directs the Secretary of Commerce to review the feasibility of
establishing a risk sharing pool "to provide coverage for vessels and
owners against liability from civil suits by observers."'8 9  This
provision only makes sense if suits by observers against vessel owners
are available to observers. If Congress had intended to preclude
certain suits by fisheries observers, it could have done so either when
the Magnuson Act was initially enacted (four years after the MMPA),
or in any of the numerous amendments added throughout the last two
decades.
Nine months after Judge Rothstein's last ruling, however, Judge
John Coughenour held that observers were seamen for purposes of a
preferred maritime lien in State Street Bank and Trust v. F/V Yukon
Princess.'9" Relying on Key Bank of Washington v. Dona Karen
Marie, Judge Coughenour reasoned that because the vessel on which
the observer worked was engaged in navigation, the observer had a
more or less permanent connection with the vessel, and the observer
was aboard primarily to contribute to the function of the vessel, the
188. Id.
189. 16 U.S.C. § 1362(e)(1) (1988).
190. No. C93-5465C (W.D. Wash. Dec. 22, 1993) (order on conferring preferred maritime
lien).
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observer qualified as a seaman under maritime law.'91 Judge Cough-
enour clarified that,
observers have the requisite employment connection to the vessel
even if they are paid by an independent contractor to attain seaman
status ... whether an observer is a seaman under maritime law is
not a factual question. The court's determination that an observer
is a seaman is based on the observer's theoretical job description.
Whether the observer performed such duties aboard the vessel is a
question of fact that is not in dispute. 192
A month later, in West One Bank v. Continuity,'93 Judge Coughenour
affirmed his previous ruling by holding that, "an observer falls within
the definition of seaman under 46 U.S.C. § 10101(3)." 
94
In February of 1994, in Key Bank of Washington v. Yukon
Challenger,19 Judge Carolyn Dimmick also had the opportunity to
address whether an observer was a seaman for purposes of asserting a
maritime lien for crew wages. Like Judges Rothstein and Coughenour
before her, Judge Dimmick found the observer to be a seaman because
the observer had an "employment-related connection to a vessel in
navigation. 1 96
Two months later, in Coyne v. Seacatcher Fisheries, Inc.,197
Judge Zily had the opportunity to revisit the issue. However, this
time the observer's claim did not arise in the context of a maritime lien
for crew wages. The observer before Judge Zilly brought a claim
under the Jones Act for verbal and sexual harassment by the vessel's
fishmaster. 98 Judge Zilly, relying on Judge Rothstein's holding in
Arctic Alaska Fisheries Corp. v. Feldman, held that the observer was not
a seaman.' 9  In doing so, he agreed with Judge Rothstein: The
provision barring certain suits by observers against vessel owners under
the MMPA applied to this Magnuson Act observer.
On February 1, 1995, the last ruling on this issue to date was
handed down by a District Court within the Ninth Circuit. In Key
Bank of Washington v. FIT Pacific Orion, Judge Zilly relied on his
prior decision in Key Bank of Puget Sound v. F/V Aleutian Mist in
191. Id.
192. Id. at 5.
193. No. C93-1218C (W.D. Wash. Jan. 19, 1994) (minute order).
194. Id.
195. No. C93-1157D (W.D. Wash. Feb. 22, 1994) (order).
196. Id. at 7.





holding that, "the employees of Arctic Observers serving on the F/T
Pacific Orion as fisheries observers were not 'seamen' and thus wages
advanced to them cannot serve as the basis for a maritime wage
lien. "2
Until there is Congressional or judicial resolution to this issue,
these cases will continue to beleaguer the District Courts. Future court
decisions will likely lead to further course changes regarding the
observer's proper legal status. And, as long as there are contradictory
rulings, future observers cannot be assured of adequate and predictable
remedies.
C. Sound Jurisprudence: How Observers Satisfy the
Test for Seaman Status
Although the question of whether an observer qualifies as a
seaman has engendered much debate, the three-prong test for seaman
status as applied to the observer is relatively straightforward.
First, the vessel on which the observer is aboard will be engaged
in navigation. The observer's job is to collect scientific data from the
catch of commercial fisherman while the crew is actively fishing. This
cannot take place unless the vessel is in navigation. Thus, the first
prong of the test will seldom pose a problem to the observer.
Second, the observer has a "more or less" permanent connection
with the vessel. This second prong of the test only requires that an
individual have more than a transitory relationship with the vessel.2 °1
Observers have extensive contact with the same vessel, sometimes
stationed there for months at a time. This contact goes far beyond a
mere transitory relationship. Thus, the second prong of the test will
likewise rarely pose a problem to the observer.
Third, the observer performs duties which contribute to the
function of a vessel or to the accomplishment of its mission. Although
this prong could have potentially posed a problem before McDermott
International, Inc. v. Wilander, °2 the Supreme Court has clarified
that to "aid in navigation" means simply to perform duties which
contribute to the function of the vessel or the accomplishment of its
mission.0 3 Because vessels are required by federal law to have an
observer on board, a fishing venture, at least legally speaking, would
200. No. C93-806Z (W.D. Wash. Feb. 1., 1995) (minute order).
201. See Bullis v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 474 F.2d 392, 394 (9th Cir. 1973)
(holding that movie extras who spent two hours on board do not have a "more or less permanent"
relationship with the vessel).
202. McDermott Int'l, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337 (1991).
203. Id.
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be impossible without them.2' By keeping vessels in compliance
with federal law, and allowing them to fish lawfully, observers
contribute to the function of the vessel and the accomplishment of its
mission.
Though the vessel cannot legally fish without an observer, an
observer is more than a license to fish. Observers are an invaluable
component of the fishing industry's mission. Not only do observers
allow current vessels to accomplish their missions, but they also
guarantee that future vessels will accomplish their missions by ensuring
that fishery resources are available in years to come. The purpose of
the observer program under the Magnuson Act is to observe and
manage fishery resources so that there will be continued resources for
the commercial vessels to harvest.05 The information gathered by
Magnuson Act observers is essential to protect coastal fish, the national
fishing industry, and dependent coastal economies from stresses caused
by overfishing waters adjacent to the territorial waters.0 6 In this
respect, observers are as important to the overall mission of the
commercial fishing industry as any other individual on board the
vessel. Thus, on both a short-term and long-term basis, fisheries
observers are vital to the accomplishment of the mission of the vessel.
Because observers meet the three-prong test for seaman status they
should be afforded legal remedies equal to those of traditional seamen.
Given the Supreme Court's liberal interpretation of the third require-
ment for seaman status, to hold otherwise would run afoul of the
Court's underlying policy rationale and demonstrate a swing back to
earlier, more rigid definitions of a seaman. The Supreme Court has
emphasized that the underlying policy basis for granting special
maritime remedies to certain groups of employees is to compensate or
offset "the special hazards and disadvantages to which they who go
down to sea are subjected.""2 7  Because Magnuson Act fisheries
observers are subjected to the special hazards and disadvantages of the
North Pacific, they should be afforded the same basic protections that
are afforded to traditional seamen.
204. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
205. 16 U.S.C. § 1801(b) (1988).
206. Lovgren v. Byrne, 787 F.2d 857, 861 (3d Cir. 1986).
207. Wilander, 498 U.S. at 354. See supra Part W.A. & note 163.
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D. The Final Obstacle: The "Employee" Requirement
If observers are granted seaman status, vessel owners will owe
them the duty of seaworthiness. 08 However, an employer-employee
relationship is essential to recover under the remedies of maintenance
and cure and the Jones Act.2" Because the National Marine Fisher-
ies Service Research Plan requires observers to be employed by
independent contracting agents, observers are not direct employees of
the vessel.210
The drafters of the Research Plan intended the contractual
separation of vessel owner from observer as a protection both for the
observer and for the integrity of the observer program. The purpose
in establishing this structure was to circumvent collusion between the
vessel owner and the observer, and to encourage accurate reporting and
observation by taking the observer out of the subordinate employer-
employee relationship with the vessel owner. Observers are therefore
forbidden to have any financial interest in the vessels to which they are
assigned, and are prohibited from being paid directly by vessel
owners.211
However, even though observers are not direct employees of the
vessel owner, observers should not be precluded from bringing a cause
of action under the Jones Act or for maintenance and cure for two
reasons.
First, observers satisfy three of the four factors considered in
determining the existence of an employment relationship under the
Jones Act. These factors are (1) the selection of engagement of the
putative employee; (2) the situation vis a vis payment of wages; (3) the
situs of the power of dismissal; and (4) the situs of control over on the
job conduct.212  Of these factors, the right of control, including the
right to direct the manner in which the work shall be done, is the most
crucial. 3  Although the vessel owner does not select the particular
observer for the vessel, he does pay for the observer, he does have the
power to dismiss the observer if he is willing to forego his legal right
208. See supra notes 113-19 and accompanying text.
209. Craig v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 19 F.3d 472 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 203
(1994); Heath v. American Sail Training Association, 644 F. Supp. 1459, 1468 (D.R.I. 1986).
210. National Marine Fisheries Service, Observer Plan, Jul. 2, 1991 (on file with the Seattle
University Law Review).
211. The actual cost of maintaining the observer is nonetheless borne by both the vessel
owners and NMFS. See supra Part II.B.2.b. and notes 60-65.
212. Heath, 644 F. Supp at 1468.
213. Id.
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to fish in certain areas, and he does satisfy the most crucial factor by
maintaining significant control over the observer.
The structure of the observer program gives NMFS little control
over observer personnel once the observer is assigned to a vessel.214
For all practical purposes, once aboard the observer becomes an
"employee" of the vessel operator and is subject to many of his orders.
Although a vessel operator cannot lawfully interfere with an observer
doing his job,21 5 the vessel operator still controls the observer in
many situations. For example, the vessel operator has direct control
over the observer's actions when he feels such actions jeopardize the
vessel's performance or where he deems conditions to be unsafe for the
observer's presence. As a general rule, an observer is subject to the
orders of the vessel operator on all matters of safety and accommoda-
tions.
Second, the policy reasons for including the "employee" require-
ment within the Jones Act do not apply to the observer. Congress
intended that employees of the vessel should be allowed to recover
against their employer for negligence, but did not want to extend this
remedy to passengers aboard such vessels who merely had a transitory
connection with the vessel. Because crew members were subject to the
possibly negligent orders of the vessel operator, Congress wanted to
ensure that vessel operators owed a higher duty of care to crew
members than passengers. The "employee" requirement was merely
added to distinguish crew members from passengers.216 Observers,
like crew members, are also subject to the possibly negligent orders of
the vessel owner, and are therefore owed a higher duty of care.
Thus, because observers satisfy three of the four factors in
determining an employment relationship, including the key factor of
control, and because observers are subject to the negligent orders of the
vessel owner, observers should be afforded both maintenance and cure
and Jones Act remedies.
V. THE REAUTHORIZATION OF THE MAGNUSON ACT
The Magnuson Act provides an opportunity to clearly define the
observer's legal status and to grant observers the legal protection they
deserve. The Act was in the process of reauthorization during the
214. Mandy Merklein, Observers Observed, ALASKA'S MARINE RESOURCES, Dec. 1991, at 3.
215. The Magnuson Act provides that it is unlawful for any person, "to forcibly assault,
resist, oppose, impede, intimidate, or interfere with any observer on a vessel under [the] Act."
16 U.S.C. § 1857(1XL) (Supp. 111990).
216. See SCHOENBAUM, supra note 35 at 167-76.
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104th Congress when this Comment was written." 7 Senate Bill 39
and House Resolution 39 to amend the Magnuson Act were introduced
into Congress on January 4, 1995.1 However, as originally pro-
posed, neither piece of legislation extended the necessary legal
protections to observers.
B. Senate Bill 39: When is a Seaman Not a Seaman?
Senate Bill 39, Section 403(c), Wages as Maritime Liens, states
"[c]laims for observers' wages shall be considered maritime liens
against the vessel and be accorded the same priority as seaman's liens
under admiralty and general maritime law."219 Although this section
would grant observers seaman status for purposes of their wage claims,
it could create further uncertainty regarding the observers' status in the
context of personal injury claims.
As this Comment has discussed, District Courts within the Ninth
Circuit have granted observers seaman status in the context of
maritime liens for crew wages, but have not extended this status to
claims for personal injury.220 Thus, whether an observer is granted
seaman status depends on whether the observer brings a claim for
personal injuries or a claim for a preferred maritime lien for crew
wages, although the test for seaman status is the same in both con-
texts.22' Because an observer's legal status varies according to the
context in which the claim is brought, these rulings create uncertainty.
Senate Bill 39 would simply codify this uncertainty.
To illustrate the contradictory results of Section 403(c), consider
the situation where a vessel catches fire due to the negligence of the
vessel owner, both injuring an observer and causing the owner to later
default on the vessel's preferred ship mortgage. An in rem proceeding
and sale of the vessel ensues. The observer brings an action for
personal injuries under the Jones Act, and an action to establish his
priority lien status for crew wages. The courts would apply the three-
prong test for seaman status to the observer and could likely find the
observer is a seaman and is not a seaman: The observer is a seaman
for the purpose of the lien status, but the observer is not a seaman for
the purpose of the personal injury claim. Congress could eliminate this
uncertainty, and the litigation that invariably accompanies legal
217. See S. 39, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); H.R. 39, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
218. Id.
219. S. 39 § 4 03(c).
220. See supra Part IV.B.
221. See supra note 174.
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uncertainty, by simply acknowledging that an observer is a seaman in
all contexts.
B. House Resolution 39: Civil Suits By Fisheries
Observers Walk the Plank
House Resolution 39, Section 15(a), Civil Action, states, "[a]n
observer . .. may not bring an action under any law of the United
States for . . . illness, disability, injury, or death against the vessel or
vessel owner, except that a civil action may be brought against the
vessel owner for the owner's willful misconduct ... [or if] the observer
is engaged by the owner . . . to perform any duties in service to the
vessel. "222
This section would prohibit observers from bringing suit against
vessel owners, except in two limited circumstances (1) when the
owner's misconduct is willful, or (2) when the owner engages the
observer to perform duties in service to the vessel. Section 15(a) is
manifestly unfair for three reasons.
First, an observer would be the only individual on a commercial
fishing vessel with no legal recourse against the vessel owner in the
case of owner negligence. Even though observers share the same work
space and are exposed to many of the same negligent acts of the vessel
operator and crew, observers would be barred from bringing any form
of negligence action against the vessel owner. In essence, the federal
government asks observers to incur the risks of working on the high
seas without securing for them the same rights and protections it has
secured for the commercial fishermen they work alongside.
Second, if Section 15(a) is enacted, there would be no real prospect
of penalty against the vessel owner or operator where his action or
inaction, intentional or negligent, causes injury to an observer.
Compensating for injuries is an effective way to ensure vessel operators
are concerned for the observers' health and safety. This is especially
true where the risk of injury aboard a commercial fishing vessel is
largely uncontrolled by the observer.
Finally, observers are neither a potent political force nor a
cohesive group. As one observer contractor noted,
As a group [observers] tend to be young.. . . They have no union;
there seems to be no one who will function as their advocate. Their
position is not unlike that of the seamen of old who were easily
222. H.R. 39 § 15(a).
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taken advantage of by men of affairs. Their work is hardly without
risk.223
The federal government should not require observers to take such risks
without the rights and remedies equal to others who work on the high
seas.
VI. CONCLUSION
Fishery resources are finite but renewable. If placed under sound
management before overfishing has caused irreversible effects, the
fisheries can be conserved and maintained so as to provide optimum
yields on a continuing basis.24
Observers are crucial to the survival of our marine resources.
Congress has emphasized that the federal interests at stake in the
effective enforcement of Fisheries Management programs are vital to
our nation.25 Circuit Courts have agreed that there is a strong
federal interest in protecting the natural resources within our domestic
waters.226 Observers are the individuals responsible for the protec-
tion of these vital natural resources. Observers, in turn, deserve
protection under the law commensurate with the task they perform.
An observer's work is conducted on the high seas where perilous
conditions can result in injuries of every description. Other workers
of the sea have historically been compensated for these risks. As
Justice Story stated over 170 years ago:
Seamen are by the peculiarity of their lives liable to sudden sickness
... exposure to perils, and exhausting labour . . .. If some
provision is not made for them in sickness at the expense of the
ship, they must often ... suffer the accumulated evils of disease .
... Every act of legislation which secures their health, increases
their comforts, and administers to their infirmities.., encourages
seamen to engage in perilous voyages .... [I]t urges the seamen
to encounter hazards in the ship's service from which they might
otherwise be disposed to withdraw.227
223. Letter from David Edick, General Manager, Alaskan Observers, Inc., to Barbara J.
Rothstein, Chief United States District Judge, Western District of Washington at Seattle (May
28, 1993) (on file with the Seattle University Law Review).
224. 16 U.S.C. § 1801(aX5).
225. Lovgren v. Byrne, 787 F.2d 857, 866 (3rd Cir. 1986); United States v. Kaiyo Maru No.
53, 699 F.2d 989, 995 (9th Cir. 1983) ("Congress was aware that an important national asset was
at stake and that strong measures were necessary.").
226. Id.; Lotmgren, 787 F.2d at 866; Kaiyo Maru, 699 F.2d at 995.
227. Harden v. Gordon, 11 F. Cas. 480, 483 (C.C.D. Me. 1823) (No. 6047).
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Currently, half of all observers choose not to repeat a trip.2
Retention of qualified and competent observers may be accomplished
by affording adequate compensation should an observer become injured
in his uniquely treacherous workplace. The traditional seaman's
remedies, especially the Jones Act, are necessary to achieve this end.
If adequate protection is not provided soon, observers could become as
endangered as the fishery resources they monitor.
228. Merklein, supra note 214, at 3.
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